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Land issues are at the heart of the Congolese conflicts (Huggins 2010; Vlassenroot 2004; Mathieu et al. 1999; Mararo 1997). 
Land issues have mainly been analyzed as a rural phenomenon. More recently, however, scholars have shown that land 
issues are crucially important in urban areas as well (Büscher 2012; Wagemakers et al. 2009; Büscher 2018; Büscher and 
Vlassenroot 2010; Peyton 2018).
Land is a key resource and its attribution is of vital economic and political concern across societal groups. Crucially, therefore, 
the control of land is a key determinant of power in the Congo. Land is not only important as a material resource; it is also 
woven into many aspects of social life for Congo’s urban residents. Occupation and possession of land are important sources 
of prestige and self-esteem, and it contributes in no small way to determining people’s social, economic, and political 
positions in society (Büscher 2012). 
Hence, land issues relate to questions of property more broadly, and as such implicates social, economic, and political 
power relations in the widest sense (Lund and Boone 2013, 1).
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	 In	 this	 policy	 brief	 we	 analyze	 the	 nexus	 between	 conflict,	
property	rights,	and	land	governance	in	the	Panzi	neighborhood	of	Bukavu,	
the	 provincial	 capital	 of	 South	 Kivu.	 Bukavu	 is	 separated	 from	 Rwanda	
by	 Lake	Kivu	 and	 the	Ruzizi	 River	 and	 is	 situated	 at	 1460	meters	 above	
sea	 level.	 Administratively,	 Bukavu	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 municipalities:	
Ibanda,	Kadutu	 and	 Bagira.	 Together,	 they	 cover	 an	 area	 of	 60km2.	The	
neighborhood	 of	 Panzi	 is	 situated	 in	 the	 municipality	 of	 Ibanda	 and	 is	
subdivided	into	six	cellules1	and	82	avenues.	This	brief	uses	a	mixed-methods	
approach.	The	 empirical	 base	 of	 the	 paper	 consists	 of	 approximately	 100	
qualitative	 interviews	with	 different	 kinds	 of	 interlocutors	 including	 state	
officials	 situated	 at	 various	 levels	 and	 residents.	 The	 quantitative	 part	 of	
the	research	is	based	on	a	survey	of	375	heads	of	household	selected	using	a	
random	sampling	method.		
	 Property	 rights	 are	 notoriously	 precarious	 in	 Panzi,	 as	 they	
are	 in	 other	 urban	 areas	 of	 eastern	 Congo.	 Several	 factors	 contribute	 to	
this	 situation.	 They	 include	 the	 ambiguity	 of	 Congolese	 land	 legislation,	
rampant	corruption	in	the	land	administration,	rising	demographic	pressure,	

















exposes	 a	 curious	 puzzle	 about	 land	 governance	 in	 the	Congo:	 the	 law	 is	




involved	 in	 land	 governance	 deploy	 the	 law	 as	 a	 language	 and	 a	 tactic	 of	
power.	They	fetishize	the	law	as	a	symbol	of	sovereignty,	and	they	use	it	to	
assert	 their	authority	to	exercise	 jurisdiction	over	 land	 issues	and	to	 justify	
the	extraction	of	unofficial	 income	from	Panzi	 residents.	 In	 this	way,	 land	
authorities	deploy	the	language	of	the	law	to	create	an	alternative	order	that	
facilitates	 irregular	 resource	 extraction	 from	Panzi	 residents.	On	 the	other	
hand,	 Panzi	 residents	 tend	 to	 fetishize	 the	 law	 as	 an	 ideal	 of	 governance.	
Their	 understanding	 of	 the	 law	 as	 an	 instrument	 meant	 to	 protect	 their	






	 As	 such,	 we	 argue	 in	 this	 research	 brief	 that	 the	 phenomenon	
of	 anarchic	 constructions	 is	 not	 the	 result	 of	 a	 spontaneous	 and	 chaotic	
process	of	urbanization.	Rather,	as	we	show,	it	is	a	set	of	practices,	in	which	
the	 law—paradoxically—is	 applied	 in	 a	 calculated	way	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
vast	majority	of	people’s	plots	and	buildings	 in	effect	do	not	comply	with	
the	 law.	Consequently,	most	Panzi	 residents’	 property	 rights	 are	 temporal	
and	ephemeral.	However,	the	disenfranchisement	of	people’s	land	rights	in	
this	case	is	not	the	work	of	a	grand	conspiracy	by	Bukavu’s	land	authorities.	
Rather,	 the	 regime	 of	 practices	 is	 upheld	 by	 a	 myriad	 of	 micro-practices	
of	 power,	 enacted	 by	 a	 multitude	 of	 land	 authorities	 that	 compete	 and	
collaborate	with	each	other	in	unpredictable	patterns.
CONFLICT, MIGRATION, AND 
DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH IN PANZI
The	conflicts	of	eastern	Congo	have	had	a	deeply	 transformative	effect	on	
urban	 space,	 land	 governance,	 and	 property	 rights	 in	 Bukavu.	 Bukavu’s	
population	 and	 built-up	 area	 have	 grown	 significantly	 since	 the	 1970s.	
Between	 1970	 and	 2002	 (near	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Second	Congo	War	 [1998-











roughly	 50	 percent	 of	 Panzi’s	 growth.	 The	 remaining	 50	 percent	
migrated	from	another	urban	area.	Research	on	the	transformation	
of	 eastern	 Congo’s	 urban	 areas	 suggests	 that	 the	 region’s	 violent	
conflicts	and	 insecurity	drove	 rural-urban	migration	 (Peyton	2018,	
213;	 Büscher	 2012,	 494;	 Sadiki	 et	 al.	 2010,	 2013).	 However,	 the	
research	 shows	 that	 insecurity	 was	 not	 the	 predominant	 reason	
people	moved	to	Panzi.	Instead,	the	reason	most	frequently	cited	by	
rural	migrants	was	“lower	living	costs”	(42.4	percent).	By	comparison,	
“security”	 was	 the	 second-most	 frequently	 cited	 reason	 (18.6	







has	 not	 grown	 substantially	 (see	Map	 2).	Officially,	 the	 city	 limits	
have	 not	 changed,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 the	 population	 pressure	 on	 the	
available	land	has	increased.	However,	the	city	limits	have	spilled	over	
into	Kabare	territory,	especially	in	the	area	south	of	Panzi	(see	Map	
2).	Consequently,	 just	 as	 in	other	urban	centers	 in	 eastern	Congo,	









ACCESS TO LAND AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PANZI
There	are	several	statutory	institutions	involved	in	land	governance	in	Panzi.	
The	most	 important	ones	 are	 the	Cadastre	 (Land	Registry	Office),	which	
is	 linked	to	the	Ministère des Affaires Foncières	 (Ministry	of	Land	Affairs);	
the Division d’Urbanisme et Habitation	(Department	of	Urbanisation	and	
Housing),	which	 is	 in	charge	of	 enforcing	urban	planning	guidelines;	 and	
the Maisons Communales	 (Communal	Offices),	headed	by	a	burgomaster.	
In	addition	there	 is	 the	 so-called	cadre de base	 (grassroots	executives).	The	
cadres de base	are	 local	chiefs	associated	with	the	Mairie	 (Mayor’s	Office),	
which	oversees	the	Communal	Offices.	The cadre de base is	organized	within	
a	 pyramidal	 administrative	 structure	 and	 is	 headed	 by	 a	 chef de quartier 
(neighborhood	chief).	Neighborhood	chiefs	who	play	an	important	role	in	
land	governance,	 and	 especially	 the	 resolution	of	 land	disputes	 are	official	
entities	 recognized	by	 law,	but	 their	own	subordinates	are	not	granted	the	
status	of	a	civil	servant.
	 Officially,	 there	 are	 no	more	 available	 plots	 in	 Panzi.4	 Yet	 some	
actors	claim	that	plots	are	still	being	sold	on	the	banks	of	the	Ruzizi	River	
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is	diminished	by	this	practice.
	 Property	 rights	 are	 tenuous	 in	 Panzi	 for	 various	 reasons.	 First,	
since	 the	passing	 of	 the	 current	 land	 law,	 the	 1966	 so-called	Bakajika	 law,	
amended	in	1973	and	1980,	definitive	private	land	rights	do	not	exist	in	the	
Congo.	The	Bakajika	 law	 is	 a	 series	 of	 laws	 that	 nationalized	 all	 land	 and	
recognized	 the	 state	 as	 the	 supreme	proprietor	 and	owner	of	 the	national	
soil,	as	well	as	all	resources	located	in	the	sub-soils	of	the	national	territory.	
The	Bakajika	law	stipulated	that	land	could	be	individually	bought	and	sold	
and	 protected	 by	 a	Certificat d’Enregistrement	 (certificate	 of	 ownership),	
which	 is	 delivered	 by	 the	 conservateur des titres immobiliers	 (custodian	 of	
property	titles)	in	collaboration	with	the	Services de Cadastre	(Land	Registry	




recently	a	new	road	was	built	southward	in	the	direction	of	the	Plaine de la 










of	 our	 sampled	 households	 do	 indeed	 live	 below	 the	 global	 poverty	 line.	
This	measurement	 indicates	 that	most	 residents	 cannot	 afford	 to	 acquire	
the	necessary	certificate	of	ownership	from	the	Land	Registry.	The	process	
is	slow,	expensive,	and	nontransparent,	and	the	outcome	is	uncertain.	The	
price	of	 the	certificate	of	ownership	 is	 said	 to	vary	between	500	and	1200	
USD.	The	certificate	of	ownership	is,	therefore,	out	of	reach	for	most	Panzi	











the Attestations d’Occupation Parcellaire	(Proof	of	Occupation	of	Plot)	and	
the Attestations de Propriété (Proof	of	Ownership).	The	 former	 are	 issued	
by the Division d’Urbanisme et Habitation	 (Department	 of	Urbanisation	






A part of the neighborhood of Panzi built on the steep slopes of the Ruzizi River.
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authorities.	The	legal	status	of	these	title	deeds	became	uncertain	with	the	
passing	of	the	land	law	of	1973.	Of	the	two,	the	Proof	of	Ownership	issued	





rather	 than	 the	 Proof	 of	 Occupation	 of	 Plot.	 Until	 2007	 it	 was	 the	
prerogative	of	the	Communal	Offices	to	issue	this	document,	which	means	
that	many	older	land	deeds	are	of	this	type.	At	the	same	time	it	is	the	least	
expensive	document	of	 the	two,	which	makes	 it	more	accessible	 to	Panzi’s	




















to	 extraction	 and	 extortion	 by	 land	 authorities	 and	 ultimately	 also	 to	
expropriation.
RENT-SEEKING AND TENURE (IN)SECURITY
With	a	few	exceptions,	Congolese	state	institutions	are	characterized	by	low	
levels	of	 legitimacy,	drastic	resource	shortfalls,	and	technical	shortcomings.	
In	 spite	 of	 this,	 Congolese	 state	 institutions	 persist	 and	 even	 proliferate	














	 These	 administrative	 fees	 are	 only	 some	 of	 the	 many	 forms	 of	
resource	 extraction	 from	 Panzi	 residents	 that	 Congolese	 land	 authorities	
engage	 in.	 Congolese	 land	 authorities	 make	 verification	 missions	 to	 the	









boundaries	 of	 easements	 and	 public	 space,	 or	 redirect	 overland	 sewers	 to	
make	 space	 for	 their	buildings.	Moreover,	as	we	have	 shown,	people	often	
do	 not	 possess	 the	 documents	 and	 deeds	 required	 by	 the	 law.	 The	 land	
authorities are partly responsible for the situation as urban plots are not 
always	 adequately	 measured,	 certificates	 are	 issued	 for	 unsafe	 land,	 and	
institutions	 rarely	cooperate	 in	 the	evaluation	and	administration	of	 these	
plots	and	houses.	Not	only	do	land	authorities	not	always	collaborate	but,	





titles	 delivered	 by	 competing	 state	 authorities	 (van	Overbeek	 2014).	 This	
competition	weighs	heavily	on	Panzi	 residents	who	can	never	know	 if	 the	
recognition	 they	 have	 received	 from	 a	 land	 authority	 is	 going	 to	 be	 valid	
when	another	one	decides	to	pay	them	a	visit.	As	one	resident	put	it:
There is a competition between the different land and property 
authorities. When one of them comes he has a tendency to ignore 
and dismiss the work of the other authorities and he tells that 
his service is the only one that can help you and that you should 
therefore place your trust in them. Since that is how it is, you pay 
them something. But then others come and tell you the same 
thing and that the money you had just paid is wasted. All of this 
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harassment means that we have no confidence in anybody.9
This	 competition	 is	 compounded	 by	 the	 at-best	 derisory	 payment	 that	
state	 officials	 receive	 as	 compensation	 for	 their	 work.	 State	 officials	 adapt	
by	seeking	out	potential	claimants	to	whom	they	may	issue	certificates,	and	
transgressions	they	may	resolve	or	issue	fines	for	(van	Overbeek	2014).










[The authorities] do everything they can in order not to inform us 
about how to acquire a title and about how much that may cost. And 
even when they do tell you, they do everything they can to hide the 
truth about the prices of the different documents you need. In that 
way they can keep you in a situation where you are always guilty so 
they can force you to negotiate with them.10
According	to	another:
All these authorities involved in land governance do nothing for 
us the inhabitants. They are only looking for their own part when 
someone sells a house or a plot. We have faith in no one. Only God 
is just.11
LAND CONFLICTS
A	 high	 frequency	 of	 land	 conflicts	 is	 one	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 Panzi’s	
“property	anarchy”	is	the	high	frequency	of	land	conflicts.	33.9	percent	of	
our	respondents	reported	to	have	been	in	a	land	conflict	during	the	preceding	
12	months.	The	majority	of	 these	 land	conflicts	 are	over	plot	boundaries.	
These	conflicts	often	emerge	because	people	try	to	push	the	limits	of	their	
plots	 into	 a	 neighbor’s	 plot.	 Torrential	 rains	 seasonally	 contribute	 to	 the	
frequency	 of	 these	 conflicts,	 as	 they	 may	 erase	 the	 boundaries	 between	
plots,	especially	when	they	result	in	mud-	or	landslides.	These	may	destroy	
houses	 and	 result	 in	 death	 or	 injury.	When	 such	 events	 occur,	 it	may	 be	
difficult	to	reconstruct	the	 limits	between	plots,	which	 in	turn	can	 lead	to	
conflicts	between	neighbors.	It	may	also	lead	to	a	public	blame	game	between	
authorities	 over	 who	 is	 responsible	 for	 allowing	 people	 to	 build	 on	 sites	
that	are	not	suited	for	construction.	Other	frequent	forms	of	land	conflict	




that	 they	 actually	 help	 solve	 people’s	 problems,	 especially	 people’s	 land	
related	problems	with	their	neighbors	and	family	members.	However,	they	
also	 help	 solve	 other	 pressing	 problems	 such	 as	 curbing	 crime	 (Perazzone	
2018).
	 In	45.81	percent	of	the	cases,	a	cadre de base	was	the	first	authority	





are	 not	 able	 to	 solve	 a	 land	 conflict	 themselves	 (29.1	 percent	 preferred	 to	
not	approach	any	authorities)	or	with	the	help	of	a	cadre de base or other 
nonofficial	authority,	 such	as	a	church	 leader	or	a	 local	notable.	There	are	
three	main	reasons	for	this.	Firstly,	cadres de base	are	cheaper	to	commission	














of the avenue,	cellule,	or	quartier,	residents	and	cadres de base	can	redistribute	
resources	 among	members	 of	 the	 community,	 rather	 than	 be	 extorted	 by	
distant	authorities	looking	to	line	their	pockets.
	 However,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 residents	 generally	 have	 an	
ambiguous	 relationship	with	 the	 cadres de base.	This	 is	 largely	due	 to	 the	
latter’s	position	as	intermediaries	between	higher-level	authorities	and	Panzi	
residents.	Much	 like	customary	chiefs	 in	 the	 rural	areas,	 the	 role	of	 cadres 
de base	 is	very	important	for	the	higher-level	authorities	who	rely	on	them	
due	to	their	status	as	local	notables	and	because	they	have	good	knowledge	





other	 land	 authorities	 in	pointing	out	 transgressions,	 and	 for	 selling	plots	





outcome	 in	a	 land	conflict.	As	 stated	above	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 statistical	
relationship	 between	 high	 household	 income	 and	 having	 a	 certificate	 of	
ownership.	People	who	have	 the	necessary	financial	means	are	able	 to	buy	
a	 certificate	of	 ownership	 from	 the	 conservateur des titres immobiliers	 and	
the Cadastre.	This	is	usually	enough	to	protect	them	against	expropriation	
and	encroaching	neighbors	or	 competing	claims	 to	 the	plot	 in	 the	 case	of	
multiple	claimants.	Moreover,	with	sufficient	financial	means,	one	can	pay	
soldiers	to	protect	one’s	property	in	case	of	a	land	conflict	with	a	neighbor.	











The authorities privilege those who have connections or family 
members or are friends of politicians, especially provincial 
ministers and deputies. These people do not have to pay the money 
Map 1.  Bukavu
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that we pay to the police or the agents who come to control us. It 
makes us angry and it is not good.14
And	a	third:
The Congolese state is not committed to protecting its citizens and 
their property. On the contrary, it tries to strip them of the little 
things that they posses. It locks its system. In order to unlock it, 
you have to use influence peddling via one’s important connections: 
deputies, ministers, or military or police officers.15
In	other	words,	people’s	social	and	economic	position	in	society,	as	reflected	
in	 the	 economic	 resources	 and	 social	 relations	 they	 are	 able	 to	 mobilize,	
are	 the	main	 factors	 shaping	 the	degree	 to	which	 their	property	 rights	 are	
recognized	and	protected.
	 The	 issue	 of	 property	 rights	 is	 among	 the	 most	 important	 issues	
facing	Panzi	residents.	Yet	for	most	people,	property	rights	are	elusive.	This	is	
partly	due	to	the	legislation,	which	denies	people	definitive	property	rights.	

















security	 that	 comes	 with	 obtaining	 legal	 status,	 you	 also	 need	 protection	
from	powerful	 individuals	capable	of	enforcing	your	property	rights.	This	
makes	 it	 almost	 impossible	 for	 all	 but	 the	well-off	 and	well-connected	 to	
possess	perennial	rights	in	Bukavu.




higher-level	 authorities	 such	 as	 those	 of	 the	Department	 of	Housing	 and	
Urbanisation	and	the	Land	Registry	Office.	As	one	resident	remarked:
The law is not respected. There is corruption and influence peddling 
of the land authorities by those who have built property, for example 
on public land, such as those who have built on the easements 
and roads. Before 2000 all of Bukavu’s neighbourhoods could be 





[The land authorities] come to sell dangerous land. They even sell 
off the easements. When they have gone we are left behind with the 
consequences of their immorality. They don’t guide people to avoid 
anarchic constructions. Instead they give in to corruption and sell 
plots that they do not have the right to sell.17
The	higher-level	land	authorities	blame	the	residents	and	the	cadres de base 
for	 the	anarchic	constructions.	For	 instance,	according	to	a	chef de bureau 
in	 the	 Mayor’s	 Office,	 the	 cadres de base are largely responsible for the 
proliferation	of	anarchic	constructions	since	they	sell	off	plots	that	are	not	
fit	for	construction.
Map 2. The growth of Bukavu’s built-up areas
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CONCLUSION: WHO’S ANARCHY?
Property	rights	are	highly	tenuous	for	the	vast	majority	of	Panzi	residents.	
Only	 11.9	 per	 cent	 of	 our	 respondents	 possess	 the	 required	 certificate	 of	
ownership.	According	to	Congolese	land	legislation,	this	is	the	only	title	deed	
that	confers	valid	property	rights	to	people,	albeit	these	are	only	user	rights.	
Due	 to	 the	 difficulty	 of	 obtaining	 such	 a	 certificate	 of	 ownership,	 Panzi	
residents	possess	a	number	of	alternative	documents,	which	they	are	able	to	
use	as	proxies	for	a	legally	valid	title	deed,	including	the	bill	of	sale	between	








of	 ownership,	 people	 can	 be	 legally	 expropriated	 without	 compensation.	
In	 conclusion,	 it	 is	 not	 simple	 to	 determine	whether	 or	 not	 someone	has	
property	rights	in	Panzi.	The	property	rights	of	Panzi	residents	are	situated	
on	 a	 continuum	 largely	 conditioned	 by	 people’s	 financial	means	 and	 the	
political,	coercive	and	economic	power	of	their	parapluie;	that	is,	their	social	
connections.
	 Political	 theory	 tends	 to	 assume	 that	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 strong	
central	 state,	 anarchy	 prevails.	 Conventionally,	 anarchy	 is	 associated	 with	
a	 spontaneity,	 rage,	 instinctual	behavior,	 corruption,	 and	 the	proliferation	
of	 violence	 and	 crime.	 Yet,	 this	 brief	 suggests	 that	 Bukavu’s	 “property	
anarchy”	 is	 anything	 but	 anarchic	 in	 the	 conventional	 sense	 of	 the	word.	
Rather,	illegality	is	produced	through	the	daily	practices	of	land	governance.	
The	problem	with	 framing	 the	nexus	between	property,	 conflict	 and	 land	
governance	as	anarchic	in	the	conventional	sense	of	the	term	is	that	it	conjures	






(the	 legal	 v.	 the	 criminal	 subject),	 but	 as	 attempts	 by	 different	 groups	 or	
individuals	 (more	 or	 less	 coordinated)	 to	 establish,	 maintain,	 or	 disturb	
a	 certain	 political	 order	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 power	 and	wealth	 that	 it	







and	financial	 resources	 that	 they	 can	muster.	This	 condition	of	 “anarchy-




would	be	misleading	 to	 resort	 to	 stereotypical	notions	of	anarchy.	Rather,	
what	needs	to	be	understood	and	answered	is	how	notions	of	anarchy	and	
order	are	employed	and	in	whose	interest.
Map 3. Panzi neighborhood
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